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INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
"By the end of the century, Europe will have a strong and stable single currency. 
This was the wish of its peoples and leaders in signing and then ratifying the Treaty on 
European Union." Thus begins the 31 May 1995 European Commission Green Paper on 
the practical arrangements for the introduction of the single currency as part of Economic 
and Monetary Union currently underway in Europe. This long-awaited green paper sets 
out the conditions for the transition to a single currency, i.e., the timetable and the 
scenario. The dates concern those of the Maastricht convergence criteria and the 
possibility or plausibility of a number of countries managing to meet them. The scenario 
concerns the logic chosen in respect of the various players involved, i.e., the States, 
banks, firms and households. There exists no historical precedent for this process of 
monetary union, in Europe.1 
A monetary union between two or more countries means that those countries 
agree to maintain the same currency. In the European context, where before there were 
French and Belgian francs, Italian lire, Dutch guilders, German Deutschmarks, Danish 
krone etc., there would be after monetary union a single currency. Thus, when countries 
proceed to join a monetary union, they give up the possibility for their own currency to be 
separate from those in the other countries and therefore give up the possibility of allowing 
the rate of exchange between their own currency and those of the other members of the 
union to vary. Logically, this means that a 'single monetary policy' exists for the area of 
currency union as a whole, regardless of whether there is one monetary authority or more. 
1 There are cases where separate political entities formed a political union before adopting a common 
currency, and others where several sovereign countries standardized their coinage without establishing a 
common central bank. However, there are no precedents in which countries with histories of monetary 
sovereignty and long-standing central banks establish a common central bank with a single common 
currency. 
2 Mike Artis and Norman Lee, ed., The Economics of the European Union: Policy and Analysis (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), 347. 
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For the case of Europe, the Economic and Monetary Union differs slightly from 
the discussion above since it implies: (i) a single market, where goods, services and 
factors circulate freely; (ii) irrevocably fixed exchange rates among participating 
currencies, and a single currency soon after; (iii) a single monetary authority 
implementing a single monetary policy; and (iv) binding rules on the size of budget 
deficits and public debt, and on the financing of deficits. 
To achieve a monetary union within Europe, the Maastricht Treaty details a three 
stage approach. Stage I removes capital controls, reduces international inflation and 
interest rate differentials, and increases the stability of intra-European exchange rates. 
Stage II furthers the convergence of national economic polices and creates a temporary 
entity, the European Monetary Institute (EMI), to coordinate member-country monetary 
policies in the final phases of the transition and to plan the move to monetary union. 
Stage III establishes the independent European central bank and transfers to it the 
responsibility for conducting monetary policy. Upon inauguration of Stage III, exchange 
rates will be irrevocably fixed and national currencies will be replaced by the single 
currency.3 Currently in Stage II, which began in January 1994, the EU is waiting for the 
Council of Heads of State to vote (by qualified majority) on whether to commence Stage 
III. 
Opinions of economists and politicians vary with regard to "with whom?" or 
"when?" this monetary union will take place. Yet, it is clear that baring any future major 
political decisions such a union will occur. While at their summit in Cannes (June 1995), 
the European Union's heads of government stated their "resolve to prepare the transition 
to the single currency by January 1st 1999 at the latest in strict accordance..." with the 
Maastricht Treaty.4 This implicit abandonment of the first target date for Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1997 only shows the reality of member state's ability to attain 
3 Barry Eichengreen, "European Monetary Unification," Journal of Economic Literature Vol XXXI (1993), 
4 The Economist. 1 July 1995. 
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the convergence criteria. By making such a declaration, the political leaders allowed for 
continuation down the Maastricht path without casting blame at specific member nations 
for prohibiting union according to the Treaty. 
Europe's leaders now must ensure that the second Maastricht deadline does not 
become as unrealistic, either economically or politically, as the first. The idea of all 15 
members qualifying for union by this deadline remains unlikely. Therefore the most 
likely consequence will be a union divided into two classes-those within the currency 
union and those outside it. As outlined in Article 109j of the Treaty on European Union, 
the European Council will confirm, before 1 July 1998, which Member States fulfill the 
necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency. Only Denmark and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have protocols established allowing for 
exemption from participating in this third stage of EMU. Granted this political "opt-out" 
clause and assuming qualification according to the convergence criteria, Denmark must 
carefully analyze the implications of participating in the monetary union. Currently the 
Danish government has given notice that Denmark will not participate in the union. 
Logicaly, the question arrises, is there a good economic case for Denmark to have 
a separate currency? Or, does Denmark increase its welfare by abolishing the krone and 
adopting the currency of the larger area of Europe? Many citizens tend to give positive 
answers to both these questions, however, the answers are not obvious. There are 
benefits and costs to a monetary union. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the 
economic issues of monetary union and its potential effects upon the Danish economy, 
and in doing so, to address the key question: is participating in EMU economically 
beneficial for Denmark? 
Although the widely held view in official EU circles that the economic benefits of 
forming a monetary union outweigh the economic costs, this issue is still highly debated 
among economists in literature. Some have even gone so far to argue that building a 
European Economic and Monetary Union is likely to be costly from an economic 
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viewpoint but that this may be a necessary price to pay to achieve the superior benefit of 
Political Union.5 To help understand the process of monetary unification, we will first 
discuss the background of the current attempt to further integrate the monetary affairs of 
Europe. 
Next we will describe the arrangements agreed upon by the Maastricht Treaty, 
before discussing the rationale for EMU. Turning towards the economic considerations, 
we will examine the overall costs and benefits associated with EMU. Finally, we take a 
close look at Denmark and in particular, the role of the Danish Central Bank in setting its 
monetary policies. Analyzing the macroeconomic situation of Denmark, we will then 
describe the overall economic basis for the Danish decison to Opt-out of monetary union. 
5 Jose Vinals, "Building a Monetary Union in Europe," CEPR Occasional Paper No. 15 (1994), 3. 
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Chapter I 
THE BACKGROUND TO MONETARY UNIFICATION 
The rationale behind the Treaty of Maastricht and its pursuit of creating an 
Economic and Monetary Union in the EU by the end of the decade cannot be understood 
unless we link it with the numerous attempts by West European countries in the last 50 
years to create a zone of exchange-rate stability. The origins of the current movement 
extend back to the founding of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC)3. 
While the Second World War had left large parts of Europe in ruins, the 
immediate consequences of the physical destruction were soon overcome and by 1948 
industrial output attained again the pre-war level. This industrial growth was supported 
by the monetary systems put in place at the end of the war. However, the Bretton Woods 
agreements4 remained irrelevant for many of the signatory countries because of another 
consequence of the war, namely the absence of an international financial system that 
could form the basis for a revival of multilateral trade.5 This applied especially to Europe 
where most trade in the late 1940's was conducted through bilateral trade agreements. 
These agreements typically contained a bilateral line of credit which determined in effect 
by how much the bilateral current account could deviate from zero, since deficits in 
excess of the specified credit line had to be settled in gold. Most European governments 
used trade policy (quotas and high tariffs) to restrict imports from creditor countries 
unwilling to extend further credit in order to preserve their small gold holdings. A major 
drawback was the lack of transferability of the bilateral balances. Deficits with one 
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country could not be offset with surpluses against another country because there was 
neither an official compensating mechanism, nor foreign exchange markets, as European 
currencies were not convertible.6 
European Payments Union 
One of the OEEC's first accomplishments, the European Payments Union (EPU), 
was established in 1950. Here countries pooled their international reserves and 
coordinated their policies with the goal of reestablishing current account convertibility. 
The EPU provided an escape from bilateralism because each month all bilateral deficits 
and surpluses were netted out into one overall net position vis-a-vis the Union. Monthly 
net positions were cumulated over time and only changes in the cumulative (starting in 
July 1950) net position of each member country with the Union had to be finally settled. 
Problems arose as countries that expected to be EPU creditors had an interest to obtain 
settlement in gold, while deficit EPU countries were interested in obtaining credit in order 
not to lose their precious gold or U.S. dollars. A compromise for the settlement of EPU 
balances established a system for mixing credit and gold payments as a function of the 
size of the EPU position relative to a quota assigned to each country. This quota equaled 
15 per cent of the sum of exports and imports in 1949. A real test of the system could be 
expected if a country exhausted its quota. 
This happened almost immediately after the system began operation. During the 
summer and autumn of 1950 the Federal Republic of Germany developed a large current-
account deficit which soon exceeded its quota (which had been calculated using 1949 
data when German foreign trade had not recovered to its pre-war level). Given its very 
low level of reserves, Germany would not be able to settle its deficit fully in gold as 
stipulated by the rules. This crisis was overcome quite rapidly through a combination of 
tighter German monetary policy, a temporary unilateral suspension of import 
6 Ibid., 5. 
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liberalization, and a special EPU credit to Germany. Although, with hindsight, it turned 
out that a tightening of monetary policy would have been sufficient to eliminate the 
German deficit, the additional policy measures were important because they showed that 
other countries were prepared to agree to policy measures that were not in their own 
short-term interests (and would even help a recent enemy) in order to save the system. 
With the EPU, the balance of payments position if each member country ceased to be a 
purely national problem and became a legitimate concern for all the other participants as 
well. This first crisis showed how the existence of an institutional framework that was 
valued by everybody could affect the outcome of a crisis. Member countries had to 
accept 'interference' in the management of their domestic policies if they wanted to 
remain in the system. 
As the terms of trade for European countries deteriorated and inflation picked up 
during the Korean War, a number of different countries - the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and France - developed deficits that exceeded their quota and had to take 
corrective policy measures if they wanted to receive favorable terms from the EPU. 
Germany, meanwhile, reversed its position, and ran a current-account surplus (that 
continued without interruption until 1981)9. By 1957-58 the cumulative EPU positions of 
most countries became large relative to their quota and the full gold settlement this 
involved meant that the EPU was no longer important for debtor countries. At the end of 
1958 the participating countries agreed unanimously to dissolve the EPU and make their 
currencies convertible. 
During the same period when EPU was established and developed, France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg created the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, and, with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 
1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958. The main practical elements 
7 Ibid., 7. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 8. 
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of the Treaty of Rome were the customs union (the 'Common Market') and the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). As the IMF fixed-rate regime appeared to be endowed with 
eternal life, the issue of exchange-rate regime is not mentioned in the treaties establishing 
the ECSC and the EEC, except for a brief reference, in Article 107 of the Treaty of Rome, 
that exchange-rate policies are to be regarded by members "as a matter of common 
concern".10 
In 1962 the Commission of the European Communities drafted its first plan for 
monetary union, which included a deadline for completion within nine years. While 
ambitious for an organization in its infancy, the 1962 initiative succeeded by establishing 
a Committee of Central Bank Governors. The Treaty of Rome tasked this Monetary 
Committee 'to promote coordination of the policies of member states in the monetary 
field to the full extent needed for the functioning of the Common Market5 (Article 105). 
thereby implicitly recognizing the threat that exchange-rate instability can pose a threat to 
free trade.11 The committee did not, however, develop an operational role until the 
1970s. 
The French devaluation of 1969 (of 11.1 per cent) was the first exchange-rate 
adjustment in the Community since the customs union and the Common Agricultural 
Policy had been established. It was preceded by almost a year of speculative pressures 
and one aborted effort to agree on a realignment in October 1968, ultimately vetoed by 
France.12 This devaluation and the German revaluation (by nearly 10 per cent) one month 
later was a major test for the Community. The functioning of the customs union was not 
really affected by these exchange-rate changes, but the CAP required policy action if 
intra-EC exchange rates moved because the prices of many agricultural products are fixed 
in a common unit which was then called the European Unit of Account (the forefather of 
the European Currency Unit, or ECU). 
10 Alfred Steinherr, ed., 30 Years of Monetary Integration From the Werner Plan to EMU (London: 
Longman Group, 1994), 62. 
111 Ibid. 
12 Gros & Thygesen, 11. 
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Since the French and German governments did not accept the price changes that 
would have followed from the exchange-rate changes, the only solution was to let the 
common agricultural market split up and maintain different prices in different countries. 
A complicated system of Monetary Compensatory Accounts (MCA) was introduced to 
balance the price differences and thereby negate the exchange-rate induced price changes. 
These MCAs acted as tariffs and import subsidies and effectively compartmentalized 
national agricultural markets. The Community recognized this and the MCAs were 
therefore supposed to be temporary, but since exchange rates continued to move 
throughout the following two decades, new MCAs were created as the old ones were 
slowly dismantled.13 Exchange-rate stability was desired to minimize this administrative 
burden placed upon the CAP. 
Under Bretton Woods System, intra-European exchange-rates were indirectly 
pegged by their parity commitments to the U.S. dollar. Pressure for exchange-rate 
stabilization increased as this system unraveled. The EEC had no credit arrangements at 
its disposal to assist members suffering from exchange rate pressures. The only official 
arrangements available at the time were the conditional drawings from the IMF and the 
network of reciprocal swaps with the New York Federal Reserve.14 As tensions 
intensified in 1968-69, the Commission presented in February 1969 a 'Memorandum on 
the coordination of economic policies and on monetary coordination in the Community', 
also know as the 'Barre Plan'. This plan sketched the skeleton of an EEC financing 
mechanism in which a 'building block' of mutual financial help was outlined. The Barre 
proposals gave rise to an internal debate which led to the decision by the European 
Council in December 1969 to reaffirm the wish to move forward to Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). Despite different priorities between nations, sufficient 
agreement was achieved to commission a major study by a group of high-ranking national 
and EC officials. In October 1970 this group, under the chairmanship of Pierre Werner 
13 Ibid., 12. 
14 Steinherr, 63. 
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(then Prime Minister of Luxembourg) produced a report that detailed how EMU could be 
attained in stages by 1980.15 
The Werner Report 
This report set out the objective of closer union in much more exact terms. 
"Goods and services, people and capital will circulate freely and without competitive 
distortions, without thereby giving rise to structural or regional disequilibrium."16 The 
group presented the argument that implementation of such a union will effect a lasting 
improvement in welfare in the Community and will reinforce the contribution of the 
Community to economic and monetary equilibrium in the world. "It (Economic and 
Monetary Union) presupposes the cooperation of the various economic and social groups, 
so that by the combined effect of the market forces and the policies elaborated and 
consciously applied by the authorities responsible, there may be achieved simultaneously 
satisfactory growth, a high level of employment, and stability."17 
The Werner Report was remarkably specific with respect to the final objective of 
EMU. Monetary Union was to imply "the total and irreversible convertibility of 
currencies, the elimination of fluctuation in exchange rates, the irrevocable fixing of 
parity rates and the complete liberalization of movements of capital."18 The report 
sketched a transition to take place in stages. During the first stage, governments would 
begin to coordinate their monetary and fiscal policies, while simultaneously limiting 
fluctuations in exchange rates. The second stage would further reduce exchange rate 
variability and price divergences. Entering the third stage participating nations would 
irrevocably fix exchange rates, remove capital controls and transfer control of monetary 
15 Gros & Thygesen, 12. 
16 Steinherr, 12. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Gros & Thygesen, 12. 
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policies of the member countries to an EC system of central banks modeled loosely on the 
U.S. Federal Reserve System. 
Significantly, the group did not necessitate the adoption of a single currency as a 
requisite for monetary union. "It may be accompanied by the maintenance of national 
monetary symbols or the establishment of a sole Community currency. From the 
technical point of view, the choice between these two solutions may seem immaterial, but 
considerations of a psychological and political nature militate in favour of the adoption of 
a sole currency, which would confirm the irreversibility of the venture."19 Similarly, the 
report was rather vague as to how the central monetary authority would be constituted and 
what its relationship to the political authorities would be. 
In the non-monetary area, the group saw the need for a "Center of decision for 
economic policy; politically responsible to the European Parliament."20 Considerable 
emphasis was placed on market related processes - the free movement of goods, services, 
people and capital. The report also stressed that factor mobility would have to be 
supplemented by public financial transfers to avoid regional and structural disequilibria 
from arising. However, the group again neglected specifically detailing the institutional 
features and procedures required to achieve union. 
Radical as it was in its prescriptions for full EMU, the Werner Report was 
nevertheless endorsed at the political level and the ECOFIN Council (Economics and 
Finance Ministers) embarked on the first of the stages designed to be completed by the 
end of 1973. The objective of EMU in the demanding version was also endorsed by the 
Heads of State and Government of the original six members, and the three new entrants 
(Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom) in October 1972. 
The Werner Report was never implemented despite the unanimous endorsement 
by the ECOFIN Council. The failure of the Werner Plan begins with the implicit reliance 
19 Steinheir, 12. 
20 Gros & Thygesen, 13. 
21 Ibid., 14. 
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on the Bretton Woods system which was collapsing at exactly the time the first stages of 
the Werner Plan were supposed to be implemented in 197322. Inflation and 
unemployment were low so that neither fiscal nor monetary policy needed to be used 
aggressively to correct major disequilibria. Likewise, at that time capital mobility was 
still low and this gave domestic monetary policy some leeway.23 
Some elements of the Werner Report were implemented in March 1972 when EC 
countries agreed to an arrangement, dubbed 'the Snake,' limiting bilateral exchange rate 
movements to 2 1/4 percent bands. However, policy convergence and coordination 
lagged behind. Thus when the first OPEC oil shock created different levels of 
unemployment across Europe, national governments came under different degrees of 
pressure to respond in ways that risked inflation. Some currencies devalued while others 
revalued, and some left the snake for short periods. Increasingly the arrangement proved 
incapable of delivering the exchange rate stability that was its central goal.24 
European Monetary System 
The EMS was set up in 1979 following the decision of the July 1978 European 
Council in Bremen to set up a "zone of monetary stability in Europe."25 Though modest 
compared to the Werner Plan, the EMS sought to stabilize exchange rates without 
requiring the elimination of international policy divergences either through the 
application of fiscal and monetary rules or by empowering the Community to coordinate 
national policies. Its central element, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), was 
designed to accommodate countries pursuing different policies. Countries were allowed 
to realign when policy divergences produced balance-of-payment disequilibria. Capital 
22 
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controls were still restrictive, thus allowing some leeway for countries to run different 
policies without immediately provoking capital movements in anticipation of 
realignment. 
The EMS was seen as a clear step towards economic and monetary union through 
trying to achieve economic convergence as well as monetary control. The experience of 
the 1970s led to a general change in approach to macroeconomic policy, with an 
emphasis on monetary control primarily aimed at the control of inflation and a rejection 
of traditional 'Keynesian' policies of fiscal expansion to counter high unemployment. 
Thus an emphasis on joint monetary action had become the prime tool with fiscal 
27 
cooperation as its necessary adjunct. 
The EMS system has not evolved quite as envisaged. The idea originally was that 
the currencies would fluctuate relatively freely inside the intervention limits. When the 
limits were reached, there would then be intervention by the central banks. In practice, 
action has been taken earlier and there has been intervention inside the margin, largely 
undertaken by the central banks in the countries approaching the lower edge of their 
band.28 
Within the ERM, the counter-inflationary stance of German monetary policy is 
generally well known. The decision of countries to pre-commit themselves to a fixed 
exchange rate with Germany therefore constitutes a very visible commitment to low 
inflation, which is relatively straightforward for the private sector to monitor. The role of 
29 
Germany as the low-inflation dominate partner of the ERM appears to be important. 
In the early period the ERM acted very much like a crawling peg with a number of 
realignments, often involving a devaluation of the French franc against the Deutschmark. 
26 Eichengreen, 1324. 
27 Britton & Mayes, 10. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Mike Artis and Norman Lee, ed., The Economics of the European Union: Policy and Analysis (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), 343. 
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The ERM subsequently shifted away from this characterization and adopted the features 
of a quasi-fixed regime. Realignments became less necessary, as national inflation rates 
began to converge. Capital liberalization began and was confirmed as an objective in the 
Single European Act of 1986. This Act committed the members of the Community to the 
creation of an integrated market free of obstacles to the unfettered movement of 
commodities, capital, and labor by the end of 1992.30 
Delors Report 
The Single European Act launched the Internal Market project in 1986, and the 
term "Economic and Monetary Union" was inscribed for the first time in the Treaty of 
Rome. In June 1988, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl put EMU on the agenda of the 
European Council in Hannover. The participating Heads of State or Government restated 
the objective of EMU and entrusted a committee chaired by Jacques Delors and 
composed of the governors of the EC central banks and three independent experts with 
"the task of studying and proposing concrete stages leading towards this union."31 
Reporting just one year later, the Delors committee established a number of 
important features. First, the Delors Report was gradualist, in that it specified an 
approach through three stages to full monetary union. In Stage One, all countries should 
be in the narrow fluctuation band of the ERM, with realignment still a feature of the 
adjustment process and all capital controls phased out. In Stage Two it was expected that 
the resort to realignment would take place 'only in exceptional circumstances' and that 
convergence of the economies would be substantially realized. The European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) would be set up, and the margins of fluctuation might be narrowed 
in preparation for the final stage. In Stage Three exchange rates would become 
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'irrevocably locked', and this would lead to monetary union. A European Central Bank 
(ECB), at the head of the ESCB, would be ready to conduct policy on its own initiative in 
Stage Three.32 
Substantiating the 'gradualist' image of the Report, these proposals for 
transitional stages contained no dates, save for the initiation of Stage One, suggested for 1 
July 1990. Despite being gradualist in this sense, however, the Delors Report dismissed 
the possibility of gradualism in another sense: it rejected the idea that a common currency 
should be created which could circulate in parallel with national moneys before being 
adopted as the single currency in Stage Three. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of 
the Report was that it introduced the idea that participating countries would have to agree 
to some constraints on their fiscal positions, as well as forgoing independence in 
monetary policy. 
Compared to the Werner Report, the Delors Report called for more centralization 
of monetary control in the hands of a Community institution to prevent national central 
banks from executing directives in different ways and so undermining the common 
monetary policy. However, the Delors Report did not push for the central control of 
national fiscal policies as the Werner Report outlined. A final contrast between the two 
reports was the insistence of the Delors Report on the early introduction of a single 
currency to insure "the irreversibility of the move to monetary union." 
32 Artis & Lee, 358. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Eichengreen, 1325. 
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Chapter II 
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
In June 1989, the European Council endorsed the plan as a basis for the 
realization of monetary union; it decided to launch the first stage as outlined in the Delors 
Report, which did not require changes in the Treaty of Rome, on July 1, 1990, and to 
undertake preparatory work for an intergovernmental conference. 
In December 1989 in Strasbourg, the European Council resolved to convene an 
intergovernmental conference for the end of 1990; its purpose would be to amend the 
Treaty of Rome in order to implement the second and third stages of EMU. The pace of 
integration within Europe had proved so great that the Treaty of Rome was viewed as 
inadequate; it lacked the legal framework necessary to support the union. A special 
Dublin Council of April, 1990, confirmed the Council's commitment to 'political union' 
and set up a parallel intergovernmental conference on the treaty provisions necessary to 
strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the union. It also set a deadline for both the 
intergovernmental conferences to complete their proposals in time for ratification by the 
member states before the end of 1992.35 The Conference commenced work in December 
1990, one year later producing draft amendments in the form of a treaty. 
The result is a Treaty on European Union, signed on 7 February, 1992, otherwise 
known as the Maastricht Treaty for the name of the Dutch city in which it was signed. It 
emphasizes not just convergence to achieve EMU but cohesion and progress on other 
fronts (social, and legal institutions) and a determination to continue the process of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. "EMU is a stage in the 
process, not the end of it; not just because of the potential for widening (increased 
involvement at the European level) but because of the intention of deepening 
35 Britton & Mayes, 22. 
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(institutional integration) it further." To support this increased level of integration, the 
European Community (EC) changed its name to the European Union (EU). 
As discussed above, an idea that for years had been relegated to academic debate 
and to ritual declarations at European meetings suddenly took off. In little more than 
three years, it advanced to the point of being completely delineated and embodied in a 
legal text signed by twelve governments. This exceptional result was achieved against 
the backdrop of rather special circumstances; the following three conditions are viewed as 
the most important:37 
• Political leadership. In the 1980s, the major European countries were governed by 
men and women whose cultural inheritance and background inclined them toward the 
idea of European unity. 
• Intellectual climate. The development of policy ideas supporting "minimum 
government" and economic deregulation made it possible in the 1980s to further the 
integration of the Community without entailing a major confrontation with national 
sovereign prerogatives. 
• Inner logic of integration. The chain of developments from the creation of the EMS 
in 1979, to the disinflation of the early 1980s, the adoption of the Internal Market in 
1986, the early liberalization of capital movements in 1987-88, and the relaunching of 
EMU in 1988 was also driven by the logic of what came to be called the "inconsistent 
quartet," that is, the impossibility of reconciling free trade, full mobility of capital, 
and fixed exchange rates with autonomous national monetary policies. 
The Need to Compromise 
The Community has been rather good at meeting deadlines in recent years, as the 
progress on agreeing the 279 measures to implement the 1992 program witnesses, and the 
36 Ibid., 23. 
37 Bini-Smaghi, 6. 
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completion of the agreement on schedule at the Maastricht Council was no exception.38. 
However, the eagerness to meet the timetable and the short notice for the proposals on 
political union have mean, that there are rather more loose ends and untidy features to the 
agreement than might have been expected. The most obvious of these relates to the 
'social chapter' of the treaty, which the UK refused to agree to and hence has been 
adopted as a separate protocol by the other eleven members. Derogations have been 
common in the pas. to permit specific member states to delay implementation of 
Community rules that gave them particularly difficult problems. However, this appears to 
be the first time that a country has been able to opt-out of an area of legislation entirely. 
The monetary union component of the treaty has not been immune from such 
compromises. Separate protocols for the UK and Denmark allow monetary union to take 
place without either country participating. The UK will only join if a positive vote m the 
House of Commons has enabled the UK government to accept entry into stage three; such 
a vote has to take place before the discussion in the European Council, i.e. before the end 
of 1996 Denmark obtained in Maastricht a similar protocol, recognizing mat Denmark 
may need to hold a referendum prior to participation in EMU; notification will have to be 
given as in the UK case, prior to the decisive discussion in the Council.40 Like the other 
member states, Denmark participates fully in the second stage, but with the Edinburgh 
decision, Denmark has notified that it will no. participate in the third stage. Reversing 
this decision requires another referendum in Denmark. 
Stages 
Monetary union, as in the Werner and Delors proposals, is intended to take place 
in three stages. But where the previous reports depicted the transitional stages in rather 
schematic terms, the Maastricht Treaty is specific about their features. 




In the Stage One (which began on 1 July 1990), the EMS countries abolished all 
remaining capital controls. It also marked the reduction of international inflation and 
interest rate differentials, and the increasing stability of intra-European exchange rates. 
Member countries strengthened the independence of their central banks and brought 
domestic laws in accordance with the treaty. However, less progress was made in 
achieving convergence of inflation and interest rates and their underlying determinants. 
As mentioned above, the exchange rate crises of 1992-93 led to the reimposition of some 
capital controls. Since then the wider bands in the ERM has helped to an increase in 
exchange rate stability, which was the primary objective of the EMS in the first place. 
Stage Two started on 1 January 1994. A new institution, the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI), was created. It will operate only during this second stage, and is in a 
sense the precursor of the European Central Bank (ECB). Its functions are limited, and 
are geared mainly towards strengthening monetary cooperation between national central 
banks and preparing the stage for the ECB. 
If during Stage Two the Council of Ministers decides (by qualified majority) that a 
majority of member countries meet the preconditions for monetary union (see criteria 
below), it may recommend that the Council of Heads of State vote (again by qualified 
majority) on whether to inaugurate Stage Three. To prevent the indefinite continuation of 
Stage Two, the Maastricht Treaty requires the Heads of State or Governments to meet no 
later than 31 December 1996 to assess whether a majority of EU members satisfy the 
conditions for monetary union and to decide whether to set a date for the beginning of 
Stage Three. If no date has been set by the end of 1997, Stage Three will begin on 
January 1st, 1999. In the latter case, Stage Three may proceed with the participation of a 
minority of EU countries. 
At the start of Stage Three, the exchange rates between national currencies will be 
irrevocably fixed. In addition, the ECB will start its operations by issuing the European 
currency (named the ecu), which will become a currency in its own right. Member 
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country's central banks will transfer the responsibility for conducting monetary policy to 
the ECB. The transition to this final stage of monetary union, however, is made 
conditional on a number of 'convergence criteria'. 
Convergence Criteria 
The Maastricht Treaty spells out criteria which a country must satisfy in order to 
be eligible for EMU membership. Specifically, the EC policy makers worried that 
admitting countries whose monetary and fiscal performance greatly differs from that of 
the rest of the Community would lead to destabilization in the union and subject the ECB 
to inflationary pressure. This fear led the framers of Maastricht to specify four 
preconditions for participating in the monetary union: (1) inflation performance, (2) fiscal 
consolidation, (3) interest rates, and (4) exchange rate stability. Each of them can be 
questioned on economic grounds, however, currently they exist as legal requirements of 
the process of unification, and therefore must be satisfied before a member nation is 
allowed to participate. A country can only join the union if: 
• its consumer price inflation rate is not more than 1.5% higher than the average of 
the three lowest inflation rates in the EMS, 
• its government debt deficit is not higher than 3% of its GDP, and its government 
debt has moved significantly towards the norm of 60% of its GDP, 
• its long-term interest rate is not more than 2% higher than the average observed 
in the three low inflation countries, 
• it has not experienced a devaluation during the two years preceding the entrance 
in the union.41 
41 Treaty on European Union. 
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European Central Bank 
The Maastricht Treaty and the Delors Report depart from previous blueprints for 
European monetary union in the importance they attach to the creation of a central bank 
dedicated to price stability. Price stability is identified in the treaty as the paramount goal 
of policy. It is the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), composed of the national 
central banks and the European Central Bank (ECB), that has the objective of maintaining 
price stability. The treaty refers to it as the ECB's "primary objective." Without 
prejudice to that objective it has to support the Community's general economic objectives 
within a clear framework of free market principles. Constitutional procedures of the ECB 
clearly insulate Europe's new monetary authorities from political and economic pressures 
to pursue other objectives. The ESCB has four tasks: (1) to define and implement 
monetary policy; (2) to conduct foreign exchange policy; (3) to manage the member 
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states' foreign exchange reserves; and (4) to promote smooth payments systems. 
The ECB is the executive organization in the system. It and all of the national 
central banks are given independence from the institutions of the Union and member state 
governments in the exercise of their functions. A six-man Executive Board, appointed by 
the Heads of State and Governments, runs the bank directly for a single term of office 
(eight year term limits). Different rules, with the same intent, apply to other members of 
the ECB's Governing Council, the body that will formulate the monetary policies that the 
Executive Board implements.43 The ECB is responsible for the note issue, open market 
operations, setting of minimum reserve requirements and other aspects of monetary 
control, although they may be exercised through the national central banks. 
To insulate monetary policy makers from political pressure for inflationary 
finance, the treaty incorporates the limits on central bank financing of budget deficits. 
Forbidden from providing credit to the EU or to national, state, and local governments, 
42 Britton & Mayes, 26. 
43 The Executive Board will be comprised of the president, the vice-president, and four additional members 
to be appointed by "common accord" of the heads of state or government. The Governing Council will 
included, in addition, the governors of the national central banks of the participating countries. 
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the ECB is prohibited from 'bailing-out' countries experiencing fiscal crises. All this 
implies a very independent European Central Bank. 
Implementation 
Unless the Maastricht Treaty is amended by the Heads of State or Governments, 
the third stage will commence no later than 1 January 1999. At that date, the monetary 
union will be a reality: exchange rates between national currencies and against the ECU 
will be fixed irrevocably. The European Central Bank will be operational and will 
conduct the single monetary policy; the ECU will be a currency in its own right; the 
foreign-exchange markets will fix its value against third currencies, for example the 
dollar and the yen. 
While the specific transition scenario has yet to be determined, the following 
reference scenario for moving to the single currency has the support of the European 
Commission. The changeover must be as short as possible so as to mitigate the risks of 
confusion that would weaken the credibility of the process and the determination of 
operators to carry it through. It must proceed in a number of well-defined phases, with 
substantial progress being made during each successive phase. It must minimize the costs 
by avoiding arrangements that call for costly transitional measures that would become 
rapidly redundant. Lastly, it must inspire public confidence and allow individual to 
become familiar with the single currency. A three-phase reference scenario is presented 




THE RATIONALE FOR EMU 
Turning 15 segmented European markets into an integrated economy whose 
constituents can specialize fully in producing goods and services in which they have a 
comparative advantage and in which factors of production can flow freely to wherever 
they reap the highest returns is hard to challenge on efficiency grounds.45 But does an 
integrated single market necessarily require a single currency and a European central bank 
to achieve these benefits? 
It is argued that separate currencies pose a significant barrier to commodity- and 
factor-market integration. Conversion costs and the uncertainty associated with the 
possibility of changes in currency prices represent the primary reasons for such a barrier. 
National currencies necessarily imply exchange rate uncertainty, and exchange rate 
uncertainty discourages cross-border transactions, according to this argument.46 
Yet the evidence that exchange rate uncertainty or variability discourages 
international trade is far from conclusive. Jeffrey Frankel (1992) considers various 
determinants of the volume of trade in a cross section of countries, concluding that the 
effect of exchange rate uncertainty, while present, is quite small.47 This is logical as 
foreign exchange forward markets permit trader to hedge currency risk at low cost. 
Service life of many kinds of plant and equipment exceeds the term to maturity of 
forward contracts. Thus, exchange rate uncertainty should have a larger effect on cross-
border investment than on trade. Robert Morsink and Willem Molle (1991) report some 
evidence that exchange rate uncertainty depresses direct foreign investment among EC 
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countries. Yet this argument can cut both ways. Firms with liabilities denominated in 
several currencies may wish to have assets whose returns are denominated in several 
currencies as well. They may set up plants to produce the same product in different 
countries to hedge against exchange risk.49 In either case, exchange rate uncertainty 
factors into firms future planning, and this risk is not completely covered with existing 
forward exchange markets. 
While current studies concerning exchange rate variability are inconclusive, we 
can argue that, if it does not effect trade or investment, then adopting a single currency is 
not necessary for efficiently fulfilling the desires of a single market. However, assuming 
the existence of exchange rate variability on trade and investment, why not simply 
minimize this variability by stabilizing exchange rates between European currencies? 
This is the basis behind the EMS. As EU countries conduct nearly two-thirds of 
their trade with one another, the success of the EMS in stabilizing intra-European 
exchange rates goes a long way toward minimizing exchange rate variability for the 
relevant countries. 
During the 1980s, extended periods of exchange rate stability delivered many of 
the benefits of fixed rates, while periodic realignments redressed serious competitiveness 
problems. This stability, however, was possible only because capital controls protected 
central banks' reserves against speculative attacks motivated by anticipation's of 
realignment. Capital controls took a variety of forms, ranging from taxes on holdings of 
foreign-currency assets to detailed regulation on the uses to which foreign currency could 
be put. All of them represented obstacles to completing the internal market.50 
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The Single European Act mandated the elimination of capital controls, and this 
was strengthened with the Maastricht Treaty. This undermined the viability of the EMS. 
Speculative crises can be characterized as self-fulfilling. Speculators observe that 
national authorities have an incentive to change their policies (the use of the exchange 
rate can sometimes be the least-cost instrument to adjust the economy after some 
disturbance). They also know that this can be done only be dropping out of the EMS. 
They then expect that this will happen, and they start a speculation. In so doing, they 
force the authorities to drop out of the system. 
This self-fulfilling nature of speculation has led some economists to propose the 
reintroduction of capital controls, thereby reducing the amount of funds that can be 
mobilized by speculators.51 However, it is doubtful that capital controls would have 
prevented the disintegration of the EMS.52 The absence of capital controls certainly 
affected the timing and the dynamics of the disintegration of the EMS, but it did not 
fundamentally alter its instability, which resulted from the credibility and the liquidity 
problems of rigidly fixed exchange rate systems.53 After all, the Bretton Woods system 
collapsed for essentially the same reason, despite the fact that capital controls existed at 
the time of its collapse. 
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Although the disintegration of the EMS was, and could be, predicted, the 
particular way it happened, of course, could not be foreseen. The recession in Europe of 
1992-93 exacerbated the conflicts between the major EMS countries about the 
appropriate monetary policy response. The inability to resolve this policy conflict lies at 
the root of the loss of confidence of economic agents in the fixity of exchange rates, and 
in the ensuing speculative crises. In some ways, the EMS intensified the recession in 
Europe. Returning to such an exchange rate arrangement, therefore, is not viewed as 
desirable. 
Focusing on the increased integration of the single market and the role of 
exchange rates, we can ask, what then are the options for the future? Monetary union 
stands ready to eliminate exchange rate uncertainty. Yet it is not the only answer; one can 
imagine two alternatives. The first is floating exchange rates. Here countries can 
integrate their economies but retain monetary authority. However, exchange rate swings 
that adversely affect competitiveness in the importing country undermines the idea of the 
single European market with full competition. This "exchange dumping" reveals the 
incompatibility of floating exchange rates with integration. 
A second alternative to monetary unification is firmly fixing exchange rates 
between existing national currencies. Yet, there exists a fundamental difference between 
a single currency and fixed exchange rates, namely an escape clause. No matter how 
earnestly a government reiterates its commitment to pegging its currency to the fixed 
regime, there remains the possibility that a change in government will lead to a change in 
policy and a devaluation. In a democracy, it is impossible to preclude the possibility that 
an existing policy instrument like the exchange rate will not be utilized. Thus pegged 
exchange rates are never credible; hence they substitute imperfectly for monetary 
unification. Monetary union, the irrevocably fixing of exchange rates, is the only way to 
achieve such credibility. 
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The prospect of the single currency in Europe poses the question of whether 
countries gain from joining a monetary union. It is impossible to quantify in any exact 
way how the balance of benefits and costs comes out for each individual participant in a 
monetary union. As Niels Thygesen explains (1994), part of the difficulty lies in the fact 
that whereas most of the benefits accrue to individual firms and consumers, the costs of 
participating in a common currency area impinge on the government and the central bank, 
who lose some of their policy instruments as they join a common currency area. The 
benefits are largely microeconomic - improving the efficiency of the economy - while 
costs are of a macroeconomic policy nature. Assessing whether benefits exceed costs, 
therefore, implies complicated weightings of the preferences of different groups in 
society, touching upon the degree to which governments reflect the balance of preferences 
in the electorate. 
Benefits 
The expectation of important microeconomic benefits from a reduction in 
exchange rate variability is based on the idea that increases in exchange rate variability 
makes trade more risky. Stabilizing exchange rates should therefore increase trade and 
hence the standard gains from trade. The irrevocable locking of exchange rates 
eliminates exchange rate variability and yields significant additional benefits. These 
gains take the form of economic efficiency improvements brought along by introduction 
of single currency. The following five sources of benefits are gained by creating a 
common currency: 
1. Elimination of transaction costs for spot exchange 
The most obvious reason for expecting significant economic gains from the 
introduction of a common currency is that this is the only way to totally eliminate all 
exchange-rate related transaction costs. These direct benefits from a common currency 
can be estimated by calculating the sum of all the transaction costs (i.e., bid-ask spreads 
and other commissions on foreign exchange-rate transactions) that arise in intra-
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Community transactions. Most of the savings come from intra-EU trade which involves 
mostly the corporate sector. Although the cost per transaction is much smaller in 
percentage terms (about 0.5 per cent) at the wholesale level at which the corporate section 
operates, the total is much higher because intra-Community trade is equal to about 530 
billion ecu, or about 13 per cent of the GDP of the Community.54 There are two sources 
of potential savings regarding intra-Community trade: (i) bid-ask spreads and other 
commissions, and , (ii) the in-house costs that arise because enterprises have to keep 
separate foreign exchange departments. Enterprises located in smaller countries can also 
expect to save in their external trade because transaction costs using the Ecu, which under 
EMU would be a major international currency, should be lower than the costs they have 
to bear at present when using the national currency. 
Assuming that an efficient EC-wide payments and clearing system is developed, 
the potential savings in transaction costs approaches 0.3-0.4% of Community GDP, i.e., 
ECU 13-20 billion (Table 2). The gains for the larger Member States whose currency is 
extensively used as a means of international payments may be of the order of 0.1-0.2% of 
national GDP. Small open economies, like Denmark, may stand to gain around 1% of 
their national GDP.55 
54 Gros & Thygesen, 250. 
55 Michael Emerson, et al., One Market. One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of 
Forming an Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 63. 
56 Emerson, 68. 
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2. Elimination of information costs and price discrimination. 
Even small transaction costs can sometimes lead to considerable distortions. The 
continuing existence of national currencies can lead to large indirect costs if it allows 
firms to engage in price discrimination between national markets. For consumers, used to 
evaluating prices in their own national currency, it is inconvenient to compare prices in 
different currencies, even if exchange rates are fixed. Retailers in borders areas use 
approximate 'round' exchange rates several per cent away from the true rates. This 
implicit information cost can be quite high. Firms exploit this to obtain some local 
monopoly power, and to charge higher prices in the markets where demand is inelastic. 
Such artificial differences in prices imply losses of economic welfare because they give a 
signal that is not related to the true scarcity of the good. 
3. Dynamic efficiency gains. 
So far the efficiency gains have not taken into account the time dimension and the 
accumulation of capital. The increase in overall efficiency that comes through the 
common currency translates also into an increase in the (marginal) productivity of capital. 
This, in turn, should raise investment, and thus lead, over time, to a higher capital stock 
until the (marginal) productivity of capital has returned to its original level. Since a 
higher capital stock means more output with the same labor force, this mechanism 
multiplies the output effect of the initial increase in efficiency. The overall increase in 
output that can be expected from a common currency, after enough time has passed to 
allow the capital stock to adjust, should be about one half to two thirds of 1 per cent of 
the Community GDP.57 Taking into account that the capital stock adjusts in response to 
an increase in economic efficiency therefore doubles the gains in terms of output that can 
be expected from a common currency. 
This dynamic effect does not double the welfare gains since the increase in capital 
stock has to be paid for by a reduction in consumption. The difference between the value 
57 Gros & Thygesen, 252. 
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of the consumption foregone and the additional output produced by additional capital is 
the welfare effect of the dynamic gain. A fully competitive system close to its 
equilibrium implies that this difference will be small. The indirect dynamic effect should 
increase therefore imply only a small additional increase in welfare. 
4. Savings through lower official international reserves. 
National monetary authorities have to keep large foreign exchange reserves to be 
seen to be able to defend exchange rates. For the countries entering the monetary union, 
foreign exchange reserves would no longer be needed to defend intra-Union exchange 
rates. Reserves would only be needed to manage the exchange rate of the Ecu against 
other currencies; primarily the U.S. dollar. While the cost of holding reserves is small 
(most are invested in interest-bearing assets), the magnitude of the savings is difficult to 
estimate since little is known about the liquidity premium central banks are prepared to 
pay when investing their reserves. However, the European Central Bank needs less 
international reserves than the sum of the holdings of member countries, therefore joining 
the monetary union will produce overall savings through lower official international 
reserves. 
5. Global effects: stronger European presence in the international monetary system and in 
global financial markets. 
A common European currency would be a strong competitor for the U.S. dollar in 
the international financial system. One can expect the Ecu to partially replace the dollar 
in global financial investments. This portfolio substitution towards the ecu does not 
produce any benefits for the Community, except for the lowering of ecu interest rates 
because global markets are willing to hold a given supply of ecu assets at a lower interest 
rate. Economic benefits can be expected from the international dimension of EMU 
through the direct seigniorage gained as the ecu bills replace the dollar in retail 
transactions around the world. However, this is a once-and-for-all gain, as opposed to the 
efficiency gains which would be available year after year. 
31 
Niels Thygesen (1994) summarizes these potential microeconomic benefits 
arguing that a common currency is a highly desirable complement to the Internal Market. 
"This becomes more obvious if it is kept in mind that the benchmark to which 
comparisons are made is no longer the stable EMS, as it existed up to September 1992, 
but rather a system with more exchange-rate flexibility and uncertainty." These benefits 
stand out more clearly now than in the heyday of confidence in a stable EMS, when many 
of these benefits could be claimed to have been already largely achieved. 
Costs 
Benefits of the single currency could be overshadowed by the macroeconomic 
costs associated with the loss of the exchange rate as an instrument of macroeconomic 
adjustment. The following costs can be occurred from monetary union. 
1. Inability to use Exchange Rate Adjustment for macroeconomic purposes. 
The size of the cost from forgoing the use of the nominal exchange rate depends 
upon several factors: (i) the magnitude and nature of nationally differentiated shocks, (ii) 
the degree of wage and price flexibility, (iii) the degree of international factor mobility, 
and (iv) the degree to which fiscal policy is orientated towards macroeconomic stability. 
In a world in which countries are faced by unexpected shocks of either domestic 
or foreign origin, real and nominal macroeconomic variables will tend to fluctuate. If 
shocks are symmetric, intra-Community exchange rates are not needed. If shocks are 
asymmetric, and EMU is present, either factor adjustment or financing must take place. 
The combination of asymmetric shocks and factor adjustments is a major determinant of 
the impact of EMU on macroeconomic stability. The first choice between factor 
adjustment and financing concerns the trade-off between real wage and employment. 
Secondly, within the financing instrument, equity considerations determine the choice 
between national or Community financing, subject to the requirements of fiscal 
discipline. 
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The adjustment to adverse shocks in EMU can to some extent be borne through 
labor market flexibility. Political considerations (in the case of regional migration) or 
welfare considerations (in the case of wage flexibility) may however put a certain limit on 
this adjustment instrument. The remaining adjustment will have to come from national or 
central public finance. Existing federations each have their own mixture between federal 
and sub-federal spending, but in any case there is a trade-off between autonomy and inter-
regional fiscal equalization. Overall, however, EMU will probably improve 
macroeconomic stability.58 
2. Costs of introducing a common currency. 
While the main cost of monetary union comes from the loss of the exchange rate 
as an adjustment instrument, additional costs from introducing the common currency 
cannot be ignored. Here, the main costs would be the initial change in accounting units 
and the cost of converting outstanding financial and other long-term contracts into the 
single currency. As this transition will occur after a period of stable exchange rates and 
presumably at the market rates of exchange, the introduction of the common currency 
would not lead to any wealth redistribution. Another switching cost is the investment 
required in hardware and software to facilitate the new currency. Great debate exists as to 
the form and usability of the new single currency, however, it is important to remember 
that all these costs would be of a-once-and-for-all nature whereas the benefits would be 
available continuously. Therefore, these costs of introducing a common currency can be 
considered negligible in the long run relative to the benefits discussed above. 
In general macroeconomic terms the basic cost-benefit assessment of irrevocably 
fixing exchange rates has to weigh (1) the cost of giving up the possibility of 
accommodating exogenous nationally differentiated, major and non-transitory shocks, 
against (2) the benefit of more definitively strengthening confidence in the long-run 
58 Emerson, 31. 
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predictability and stability of the price level.59 Additionally, one must take into account 
that fiscal policy can provide an important, but somewhat imperfect, adjustment 
mechanism. For any participant, the balance between (1) and (2) depends on the 
likelihood of future shocks and the degree of credibility of national political institutions. 






of Denmark's monetary policy helps in our analysis by allowing for comparisons between 
regimes. (It is interesting to note that officially Denmark 'maintained' its hard nosed 
stance until 1992. Only then did it state that exchange rate management was its primary 
target.) Having now identified a period when price stability was the aim of Danish 
monetary policy, we can now examine the effects of their interest rates. 
Figure 1 
Danish monetary authorities used interest rates to fight Danish inflation during the 
1980s. Thus we can expect to see a high correlation between inflation and interest rates. 
Figure 2 shows this relationship. 
The change in monetary policy targets can be seen when we examine the 
correlation of interest rate and inflation rates from 1990 to 1995. Figure 3 shows that 
interest rates do not correlate with inflation rates. 
37 

Germany has long been seen as the anchor of the EMS. Thus monetary policy set 
by the Bundesbank greatly influences the policies in the other EMS participating countries. 
Denmark has participated in the EMS since it conception in 1979. Therefore by making 
direct comparisons, we can see how independent Denmark is from Germany. 
While Denmark uses interest rates to fight Danish inflation, we should see 
movements in its exchange rate with Germany when interest rate differences change 
between the Danish Central Bank and the Bundesbank. Figure 4 plots the krone per DM 
exchange rate and the difference between Danish and German interest rates. We can see 
how the Danish interest rates vis-d-vis German rates have fallen over time. Likewise the 
exchange rate has fallen. (We can also see the how the change in policy in 1990 stabilized 
the exchange rate, with little exchange rate movement after the first quarter 1990.) 
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We should expect to see a high correlation between the difference in Danish and German 
interest rates, and the exchange rate changes. However Figure 5 shows a medium weak 
correlation to this relationship. 
This weak correlation can be explained by the decrease in inflation premium 
investors demanded from the Danish interest rates. Denmark's hard nose attitude has 
increased its credibility in the market and the overall differential vis-d-vis Germany has 
been reduced. Figure 7 plots the central bank rates for Germany and Denmark, and Figure 
8 shows the difference between the two. It is interesting to observe how the relationship 
between the Danish interest rates and the German interest rates have changed over time. 
Germany was lowering its rates while Denmark held fast to its policy in the late 1980s and 
the difference between the countries increased when German interest rates fell. 
41 
Figure 8 
In the 1980s, both Denmark and Germany maintained hard nosed monetary 
policies designed to fight their own inflation. Figures 9 and 10 plot the German interest 
rate vs. German inflation rate, and the correlation of the two respectively. This confirms 
the Bundesbank's hard nose attitude towards inflation. 
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Figure 10 
Since 1990, Danish interest rates have moved more in line with German rates. 
This is logical in that the Danish monetary authorities had given exchange rate 
management as its target policy (Denmark would set its interest rate to follow movements 
of German interest rates). Given the German hard nose attitude towards inflation, if 
German inflation increases, we would expect to see German interest rates rise, and Danish 
interest rates rise accordingly. Therefore, during the 1990-96 period of exchange rate 
management by Denmark, we should expect a higher correlation between the Danish and 
German interest rates, as compared to the 1980s when Denmark targeted domestic price 
stability. Figures 11 and 12 confirm this notion; Danish interest rates are more correlated 
with German interest rates after 1990. 
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So far I have discussed the role of the Danish Central Bank and how in the 1980s it 
maintained an independent monetary policy to fight domestic inflation. Having determined 
that Denmark does indeed posses a central bank capable of setting an independent 
monetary policy we can then ask: 
Does Denmark need an Independent Monetary Policy? 
In other words, if Denmark relinquishes its monetary authority to a European 
central bank, will it suffer any adverse effects? This brings us to the most important 
aspect of the 'costs' of joining a monetary union; namely can Denmark respond to 
asymmetric shocks with other tools besides exchange rate adjustments? 
To examine these questions we will evaluate the period from 1990 to the present, 
when Denmark was targeting exchange rate stability with its monetary policy. By doing 
so, Danish monetary authorities were focusing upon EMS and setting their interest rates 
to maintain the value of the krone. Domestic macroeconomic issues were secondary in 
nature in the monetary sense. Again, Germany was the anchor in the ERM and as 
discussed above, Denmark has held its exchange rate with Germany stable. 
In evaluating the need for an independent monetary policy, we will look to see 
how the Danish economy responds during a nationally differentiated shock. Denmark has 
not faced any major shocks, but Germany has felt the burden of German reunification and 
therefore Germany has faced an asymmetric shock with respect to Denmark. Given that 
German monetary authorities were setting policy in Germany to answer the inflationary 
pressures brought on by unification with the former East Germany, and that the Danish 
central bank followed Germany in its interest rate setting policy, we can test the 
capabilities of the other macroeconomic tools in maintaining the Danish economy. 
Before looking at the Danish economy, it is worth examining the relationship 
between Denmark and German inflation rates. Figure 13 plots the inflation rates for 
Germany and Denmark. 
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Figure 13 
We can see how inflation in both countries has declined since the late 1970s. By 
plotting the differences in inflation rates with the differences in interest rates, we will gain 




Denmark lowered its inflation rate through the 1980s by adopting a hard nosed 
policy with its interest rates, as did Germany. By 1990, Denmark's interest rate 
differential vis-d-vis Germany is quite low. Credibility for fighting inflation and managing 
macroeconomic fundamentals has lowered the interest rate premium. The Danish Central 
Bank then shifts its monetary policy towards exchange-rate stability. 
The 1990s mark an increased in interest rate movements, although the difference 
between Denmark and Germany remains small. Again we see the inflationary pressure 
Germany faced from unification. Denmark's inflation remained small, while Germany's 
rose, thus giving us a negative difference (Denmark minus Germany). Figure 16's 
correlation plot shows how unrelated the interest and inflation rate differences are between 
Denmark and Germany for this period. This reveals our asymmetric shock. 
Given the hard nose policy response telling us that as inflation rises we expect to 
see a corresponding rise in interest rate, then if Germany continues to set a European wide 
interest rate while fighting German inflation, Denmark will not be adversely affected if 
there is a strong positive correlation between German and Danish inflation rates. Figure 
17 confirms the strong positive correlation between German and Danish inflation rates in 
the 1980s. However, in the 1990s when Denmark sought exchange rate stability with 
Germany, this relationship changes as shown in Figure 18. 
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Here we clearly see the inflationary pressures felt by Germany from the unification 
Denmark's inflation did not follow, thus confirming the presence of a nationally 
differentiated shock. 
When Germany sets its interest rates to fight German inflation, and Denmark sets 
its interest rates to follow German interest rates, we expect to see a positive correlation 
between Danish interest rates and German inflation rates. Figure 19 plots these two rates 
and Figure 20 shows the correlation over the period of 1980 to 1995. 
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Figure 20 
As discussed above, Danish interest rates rose during this period following the 
German rates. This tight monetary policy was not required to fight Danish domestic 
inflation. We can therefore ask, were there any adverse consequences to Denmark as a 
result of this pursuit of exchange rate stability? 
GDP 
Figure 21 plots the Annualized, seasonally adjusted GDP levels for Denmark and 
Germany. Here we can see that Danish output actually increased in the 1990s despite the 
"high" interest rates in Denmark. 
Plotting the annual rate of change of GDP for Denmark and Germany supports this 
fact that Danish output grew faster than German output during the period of 1990 -1995. 
(Figure 22). 
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We can also compare Denmark with all 15 European Union countries. Figure 23 
plots the Quarterly, seasonally adjusted GDP levels accordingly. Figure 24 shows the 
annualized rate of change for the same time period. 
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Again we can see that after Denmark adopted the exchange rate stability monetary 
policy, it enjoyed equally if not better rates of growth in its GDP as compared to the 
whole of the EU. 
Consumption 
Comparing the consumption patterns of Denmark and Germany for both the 
government and the private sector, sheds light as to the overall welfare effects during the 
1990s. Figures 25 and 27 plot the levels of private and government consumption in both 





We can look to the balance on current transaction with the rest of the world as an 
indication of the state of the economy. It is especially a challenge for Denmark as, a small 
open economy with a particular industrial structure to maximize the benefit from the 
integrating European economy. In the 1990s, as Denmark followed its exchange rate 
stability monetary policy with Germany, we might expect the German and Danish current 
account balances to move similarly. In other words, when Germany maintains high 
interest rates to fight inflation and its currency remains strong, we would expect its current 
account to decline with the Danish current account showing the same movement. Figure 
29 plots the balance on current transactions. As we can see, this did not hold true, and the 
Danish balance actually rose to a surplus in the 1990s, while Germany's balanced moved 
to a deficit. With this we can say that no adverse effects towards trade were a result of 
the Danish exchange rate stability monetary policy. 
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Unemployment 
High unemployment levels have plagued Denmark and major structural problem 
prevent it from falling below 8%64 Given the high levels of social welfare in Denmark, we 
would expect changes in unemployment to lag the macroeconomic policies that are set by 
the Danish central bank. Thus when comparing Danish and German unemployment rates 
for signs of adverse effects from the monetary policy of the 1990s, we are somewhat 
limited for data to draw firm conclusions. Figure 30 plots the respective rates for 
Germany and Denmark. 
Figure 30 
As we can see, Danish unemployment rates have risen in the 1990s, however this 
can be attributed to the hard nose monetary policy of the late 1980s. Denmark has used 
its fiscal policy extensively to fight inflation in the 1990s, and we can see that the rates are 
beginning to decline, and are estimated to drop below the 8 1/2 % level in 1997.65 
64 European Economy No. 6 
65 EIU Country Report, 4th Quarter 1995 
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Summary 
We can draw the overall conclusion that Denmark has not been adversely affected 
during the period of 1990-95; a time when they have 'voluntarily' relinquished its 
independent monetary policy. We have seen that monetary pressures were strong (higher 
than required interest rates as set by Germany), however the other macroeconomic tools 
have responded and the Danish economy has continued to grow. 
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CONCLUSION 
The European Union has made great strides towards becoming a fully unified 
economic entity. Border obstacles and regulatory barriers to an integrated market for 
goods and services have been removed and now an integrated capital market and a 
common currency seems all but ensured. By the end of the twentieth century Europe 
should, in many respects, constitute as unified and integrated an economy as the United 
States of America. 
The third stage, leading to monetary union, is expected to commence no later than 
1 January 1999. At that date, the monetary union will be a reality: exchange rates between 
national currencies and against the ECU will be fixed irrevocably. The European Central 
Bank will be operational and will conduct the single monetary policy; the ECU will be a 
currency in its own right; the foreign-exchange markets will fix its value against third 
currencies, for example the dollar and the yen. 
The Treaty on European Union has provided Denmark an exemption from 
participating in EMU. Currently, the Danish Government has notified the European 
Council that it will not participate in the third stage. Denmark has provisions in its 
constitution allowing for another referendum before the third stage commences. As for 
the abrogation of the exemption, the procedure shall only be initiated at the request of 
Denmark. Therefore, unless Denmark requests abrogation of the exemption, monetary 
union will occur and Denmark will not be a participant. 
This paper has discussed the economic rationale for EMU and described the costs 
and benefits associated with the adoption of the single currency. Analysis of the costs for 
Denmark reveal that the prospect of relinquishing its monetary policy to the European 
Central Bank will not adversely effect the Danish economy. Therefore, from an economic 
point of view, the Danish decision to opt-out of EMU is unjustified. 
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Denmark will not enjoy the benefits provided by monetary union as described 
above. It will continue to operate as a small open economy, subject to international 
forces. By opting-out, Denmark shall retain full authority of its monetary policy. 
However, this control is viewed more symbolically than as an effective macroeconomic 
policy tool. Denmark will most likely participate in a reformulated EMS. This new EMS 
could take the form of bilateral parities against the ECU. As not all EU member states 
will have achieved a sufficient degree of economic convergence by the time EMU starts, a 
new EMS would help facilitate their future participation. Any further discussion of a new 
EMS and its relationship with the ECU would be purely speculative. 
In my opinion, Denmark would benefit far more than it would lose by participating 
in the EMU. However, it will be up to the Danes to decide what they prefer and the 
outcome of any future monetary union referendums will undoubtedly be influenced by the 
political climate at the time of voting. Ideologically, Denmark must decide whether 
monetary union will lead to political union and the perceived loss of Danish national 
identity. This same issue applies to all EU member states. Unfortunately, there is no real 
historical precedence to help the voters decide. What really is needed is strong leadership 
at the national level focused upon "the process of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe."66 
66 Treaty on European Union, (1992). 
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